This document specifies the usage of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) as a transport protocol for Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN). It provides guidances on when and how to use DTLS with the currently standardized STUN Usages. It also specifies modifications to the STUN URIs and TURN URIs and to the TURN resolution mechanism to facilitate the resolution of STUN URIs and TURN URIs into the IP address and port of STUN and TURN servers supporting DTLS as a transport protocol. This document updates RFC 5389 and RFC 5928.
1. Introduction STUN [RFC5389] defines Transport Layer Security (TLS) over TCP (simply referred to as TLS [RFC5246] ) as the transport for STUN due to additional security advantages it offers over plain UDP or TCP transport. But TCP (and thus TLS-over-TCP) is not an optimal transport when STUN is used for its originally intended purpose, which is to support multimedia sessions. This is a well documented and understood transport limitation for real-time communications.
DTLS-over-UDP (referred to in this document as simply DTLS [RFC6347] ) offers the same security advantages as TLS-over-TCP, but without the undesirable concerns.
Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] when they appear in ALL CAPS. When these words are not in ALL CAPS (such as "must" or "Must"), they have their usual English meanings, and are not to be interpreted as RFC 2119 key words.
DTLS as Transport for STUN
STUN [RFC5389] defines three transports: UDP, TCP, and TLS. This document adds DTLS as a valid transport for STUN. STUN over DTLS MUST use the same retransmission rules as STUN over UDP (as described in Section 7.2.1 of [RFC5389] ). It MUST also use the same rules that are described in Section 7.2.2 of [RFC5389] to verify the server identity. Instead of TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, which is the default cipher suite for STUN over TLS, implementations of STUN over DTLS, and deployed clients and servers, MUST support TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and MAY support other ciphersuites. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) cipher suites MUST be preferred over non-PFS cipher suites. Cipher suites with known weaknesses, such as those based on (single) DES and RC4, MUST NOT be used. Implementations MUST disable TLS-level compression. The same rules established in Section 7.2.2 of [RFC5389] for keeping open and closing TCP/TLS connections MUST be used as well for DTLS associations.
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In addition to the path MTU rules described in Section 7.1 of [RFC5389] , if the path MTU is unknown, the actual STUN message needs to be adjusted to take into account the size of the (13-byte) DTLS Record header, the MAC size, and the padding size.
By default, STUN over DTLS MUST use port 5349, the same port number as STUN over TLS. However, the SRV procedures can be implemented to use a different port (as described in Section 9 of [RFC5389] ). When using SRV records, the service name MUST be set to "stuns" and the protocol name to "udp". 
NAT Discovery Usage
As stated by Section 13 of [RFC5389] , "...TLS provides minimal security benefits..." for this particular STUN usage. DTLS will also similarly offer only limited benefit. This is because the only mandatory attribute that is TLS/DTLS protected is the XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS, which is already known by an on-path attacker, since it is the same as the source address and port of the STUN request. On the other hand, using TLS/DTLS will prevent an active attacker to inject XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS in responses. The TLS/DTLS transport will also protect the SOFTWARE attribute, which can be used to find vulnerabilities in STUN implementations.
Regardless, this usage is rarely used by itself, since using TURN [RFC5766] with ICE [RFC5245] is generally indispensable, and TURN provides the same NAT Discovery feature as part of an Allocation creation. In fact, with ICE, the NAT Discovery usage is only used when there is no longer any resource available for new Allocations in the TURN server.
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A STUN server implementing the NAT Discovery Usage and using DTLS MUST implement the denial-of-service counter-measure described in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6347] .
DTLS Support in STUN URIs
This document does not make any changes to the syntax of a STUN URI [RFC7064] . As indicated in Section 3.2 of [RFC7064] , secure transports like STUN over TLS, and now STUN over DTLS, MUST use the "stuns" URI scheme.
The <host> value MUST be used when using the rules in Section 7.2.2 of [RFC5389] to verify the server identity. A STUN URI containing an IP address MUST be rejected, unless the domain name is provided by the same mechanism that provided the STUN URI, and that this domain name can be passed to the verification code.
Connectivity Check Usage
Using DTLS would hide the USERNAME, PRIORITY, USE-CANDIDATE, ICE-CONTROLLED and ICE-CONTROLLING attributes. But because MESSAGE-INTEGRITY protects the entire STUN response using a password that is known only by looking at the SDP exchanged, it is not possible for an attacker that does not have access to this SDP to inject an incorrect XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS, XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS which would subsequently be used as a peer reflexive candidate.
Adding DTLS on top of the connectivity check would delay, and consequently impair, the ICE process. Adding additional round-trips to ICE is undesirable, so much that there is a proposal ([I-D.thomson-rtcweb-ice-dtls]) to use the DTLS handshake used by the WebRTC SRTP streams as a replacement for the connectivity checks. [RFC6062] states that TCP allocations cannot be obtained using a UDP association between client and server. The fact that DTLS uses UDP implies that TCP allocations MUST NOT be obtained using a DTLS association between client and server.
By default, TURN over DTLS uses port 5349, the same port number as TURN over TLS. However, the SRV procedures can be implemented to use a different port (as described in Section 6 of [RFC5766] . When using SRV records, the service name MUST be set to "turns" and the protocol name to "udp". The <host> value MUST be used when using the rules in Section 7.2.2 of [RFC5389] to verify the server identity. A TURN URI containing an IP address MUST be rejected, unless the domain is provided by the same mechanism that provided the TURN URI, and that this domain name can be passed to the verification code.
Resolution Mechanism for TURN over DTLS
This document defines a new Straightforward Naming Authority Pointer (S-NAPTR) application protocol tag: "turn.dtls".
The <transport> component, as provisioned or resulting from the parsing of a TURN URI, is passed without modification to the TURN resolution mechanism defined in Section 3 of [RFC5928] , but with the following alterations to that algorithm:
o The acceptable values for transport name are extended with the addition of "dtls".
o The acceptable values in the ordered list of supported TURN transports is extended with the addition of "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)".
o The resolution algorithm check rules list is extended with the addition of the following step:
If <secure> is true and <transport> is defined as "udp" but the list of TURN transports supported by the application does not contain DTLS, then the resolution MUST stop with an error.
o The 5th rule of the resolution algorithm check rules list is modified to read like this:
If <secure> is true and <transport> is not defined but the list of TURN transports supported by the application does not contain TLS or DTLS, then the resolution MUST stop with an error.
o Table 1 is modified to add the following line:
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o In step 1 of the resolution algorithm the default port for DTLS is 5349.
o In step 4 of the resolution algorithm the following is added to the list of conversions between the filtered list of TURN transports supported by the application and application protocol tags:
"turn.dtls" is used if the TURN transport is DTLS.
Note that using the [RFC5928] resolution mechanism does not imply that additional round trips to the DNS server will be needed (e.g., the TURN client will start immediately if the TURN URI contains an IP address).
Implementation Status [[Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and the reference to [RFC6982] before publication.]]
This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC6982]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.
According to [RFC6982], "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".
turnuri
Organization: Impedance Mismatch Name: turnuri 0.5.0 http://debian.implementers.org/stable/source/ turnuri.tar.gz
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Description: A reference implementation of the URI and resolution mechanism defined in this document, RFC 7065 [RFC7065] and RFC 5928 [RFC5928] .
Level of maturity:
Beta.
Coverage: Fully implements the URIs and resolution mechanism defined in this specification, in RFC 7065 and in RFC 5928.
Licensing: AGPL3
Implementation experience: TBD
Contact:
Marc Petit-Huguenin <marc@petit-huguenin.org>.
rfc5766-turn-server
Organization: This is a public project, the full list of authors and contributors here: http://turnserver.open-sys.org/downloads/ AUTHORS.
Name:
http://code.google.com/p/rfc5766-turn-server/ The usage of "udp" as a transport parameter with the "stuns" URI scheme does not introduce any specific security issues beyond those discussed in [RFC7064] . Table 1 With the DNS RRs in Figure 1 and an ordered TURN transport list of {DTLS, TLS, TCP, UDP}, the resolution algorithm will convert the TURN URI "turns:example.net" to the ordered list of IP address, port, and protocol tuples in Table 2 . o Remove the references in the abstract to make idnits happy.
